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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
mainder of the stock sold in the next year; hence, the requirement of
§ 3801 was not met. In both cases although the tax treatment of the
transaction on which basis depended was determined, this was held not
to be a sufficient determination of basis to satisfy the statute.
In the present case, the basis of the stock, in event of a favorable de-
cision to the taxpayer, was stipulated, and the court in answer to the
Commissioner's contention that the basis as stipulated was in error said,
"That issue (of basis) was not raised in the Tax Court," indicating
that, although the event determining basis was found, i.e. the reorgan-
ization was taxable, basis itself was not determined. Since basis itself
was not determined, the decision would not seem to qualify under
§ 3801, even if a taxable year covered by § 3801 were involved. This is
clearly not the result intended by the authors and sponsors of the bill, 2
and one that most courts, it is believed, will not reach.
IRVING W. ZIRBEL
Procedure- United States Impleaded Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act -Four passengers were injured in a collision between a taxicab
and a United States mail truck. Claiming diversity of citizenship, the
passengers sued the Yellow Cab Company in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Defendant cab company filed a third-
party complaint to enforce contribution from the United States. The
district court held that the United States could be made a third-party
defendant for purposes of contribution under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judg-
ment.' In a similar suit against the Capital Transit Company in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, for injuries
suffered in a collision between a streetcar and a jeep operated by a
United States soldier, the opposite conclusion was reached, and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 2 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases. Held: The United
States can be sued for contribution under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
and can be a third-party defendant for that purpose. United States v.
Yellow Cab Co.; Capital Transit Co. v. United States, 340 U. S.
17 S. Ct. 399 (1951).
12 See McGuire, Surrey, and Traynor, "Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938,"
48 Yale L. J. 509, 719 (1939). This is a good discussion by the authors of
the bill both as to coverage and mechanics of operation.
1 Howey v. Yellow Cab Co.; Gutmann v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.(2d) 967
(3rd Cir., 1950).
2 Capital Transit Co. v. United States, 183 F. (2d) 825 (D.C. Cir., 1950).
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There are two important questions involved in these cases. The first
is whether the Federal Tort Claims Act3 authorizes suits for contribu-
tion. The second is whether the Act authorizes the bringing in of
the United States as a third-party defendant. Since the Act is silent on
both questions the problem becomes one of interpretation. The broad
general rule has been that statutes waiving sovereign immunity should
be strictly construed, and nothing more allowed than has been expressly
authorized.4 Under this rule the answer to both questions would have
to be in the negative. The lower courts are split on the issue.5
The argument against bringing in the United States as a third-
party defendant for purposes of contribution is based in part on the
fact that to allow it would involve certain procedural difficulties, and
360 Stat. 843, 28 U.S.C. sec. 921 et seq. (1946 Supp.). The pertinent provisions
are found in section 931 (a) and read in part as follows; "Subject to the
provisions of this title, the United States district court ... sitting without ajury, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judg-
ment on any claim against the United States, for money only ... under cir-
cumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred. Subject to the provi-
sions of this title, the United States shall be liable in respect of such claims
to the same claimants, in the same manner, and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances ......
These cases were decided on the above quoted version. The act was re-
vised, effective September 1, 1948, and appears now with immaterial changes
as 28 U.S.C. secs. 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671,
2674-2680. The pertinent provisions are now found in sections 1346 and 2674.
4 "The principle of immunity from litigation assures the states and the nation
from unanticipated intervention in the processes of government, while its
rigors are mitigated by a sense of justice, which has continually expanded
by consent the suability of the sovereign. The history of sovereign immunity
and the practical necessity of unfettered freedom for government from crip-
pling interferences require a restriction of suability to the terms of the
consent, as to persons, courts and procedures." Great Northern Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Fead, 322 U.S. 47, 56, 64 S.Ct. 873, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944). For
a concise history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity see Yankwich, Prob-
lems Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 F.R.D. 143 (1949).5 fDenying bringing in of the United States as third party defendant for contri-
bution-Donovan v. McKenna, 80 F.Supp. 690 (D.C. Mass., 1948); Capital
Transit Co. v. United States, supra, Note 2. Allowing bringing in of the
United States-Newsum v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 79 F.Supp. 225 (D.C. N.Y.
1948); Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, Note 1.
The courts have been similarly split on the question of joinder of the
United States with an individual defendant under the FTCA. Allowing join-
der-Englehardt v. United States, 69 F.Supp. 451 (D.C. Md., 1947); Bullock
v. United States, 72 F.Supp. 445 (D.C. N.J., 1947); State of Maryland, for
use of Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 83 F.Supp. 91 (D.C. Md.
1949). Denying joinder-Drummond v. United States, 78 F.Supp. 730 (D.C.
Va., 1948); Uarte v. United States, 7 F.R.D. 705 (D.C. Cal., 1948); Sapping-
ton v. Barrett, 182 F.(2d) 102 (D.C. Cir., 1950).
6 A claimant under the act is not entitled to a jury, but an individual defendant
is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
Therefore, in an action where the U.S. and an individual are co-defendants
the same issues would be decided by the court and the jury. Furthermore,
the act gives concurrent appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals and
the Court of Claims, but the Court of Claims is not empowered to try suits
between individuals. The difficulties are not insurmountable. The private
individual might not insist on a jury, as in the Yellow Cab case, supra,
1951]
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in part by analogy in the Tucker Act,7 another broad immunity waiver
statute, which had been strictly interpreted as not allowing such pro-
cedure.8 The argument in favor of bringing in is that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were expressly made applicable in the original act,9
and that it was the Congressional intent to allow such procedure, as
shown by reports on the tort claim bill before it was passed.'
The doctrine of strict construction seems to be the main reason for
denying claims for contribution under the Act. The argument for
allowing such claims is based on the sweeping language of the Act itself,
and the maxim "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius," since the Act
expressly excludes some types of claims but does not include among
them claims for contribution." Another argument is again found in the
Congressional intent as shown by reports on the bill."2
The Supreme Court in deciding the case rejected the rule of strict
construction, and followed generally the arguments as set out above. As
a result it is now settled that the United States can be sued for con-
tribution, where allowed by local substantive law, and made a third-
party defendant for that purpose.
This decision seems to also lay down the rule that the Act is to
be liberally interpreted. That is in accord with another recent decision
of the Supreme Court in which it was held that the Act authorized
suits by subrogees, although not expressly, the court rejecting the con-
tention that the federal statute 3 prohibiting assignment of claims
against the United States should be construed to extend to claims of
Note 1. In the Englehardt case, supra, Note 4 ,the court tried the claim
against the United States, -the jury tried the claim against the individual
defendant, and both reached the same verdict. Some difficulties might be
avoided by using an advisory jury as provided in Rule 39(c), Fed. Rules
Civ. Proc. Since joinder is only permissive, the court may deny joinder
where the difficulties appear too great in advance, or at a later stage the court
may order separate trials, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 42(b).
724 Stat. 505 (1887), 28 U.S.C. secs. 791, 1331-46, 1348, 1350, 1351, 1353-57,
1359, 1397, 1399, 1402, 1491-94, 1496, 1501, 1503, 2071, 2072, 2361, 2402,
2411, 2501, 2509-11 (1948).
sUnited States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941).
928 U.S.C. sec. 932 (1946 Supp.). This section was omitted as unecessary in the
revision of Title 28, effective September 1, 1948, because "the Rules of Civil
Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all civil actions."
S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12, as to Amendment No. 61.
1o0H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945) recommended that joinder
be prohibited. The fact that joinder was not prohibited in the bill as passed
is deemed significant.
"128 U.S.C. sec. 943 (1946 Supp.).
12 Section 403 of the proposed bill provided that where the United States was
a joint tort-feasor and contribution was allowable by the local law it would
be liable only for its pro-rata share. "This provision (sec. 403) is not con-
tained in the recommended bill, and in cases involving joint tort-feasors the
rights and liabilities of the United States will be determined by the local
law." H.R. Rep. No 2245, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1942) 12.
'13 10 Stat. 170 (as amended), 31 U.S.C. sec. 203 (1948).
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subrogees.' 4 The tendency in recent years has been to provide that "the
king can do wrong," as indicated by Congress in passing a number of
acts waiving sovereign immunity, among them the Tucker Act and the
Federal Tort Claims Act. The courts, recognizing this trend, have now
begun to interpret the latter act liberally. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity has never seemed sound when applied to our own government
of limited, delegated powers and where the body that makes the laws is
not the same body that determines the rights and wrongs. Neither has it
seemed just when considered in the light of the burden it casts on the
injured party. As a result, the present decision should be heartily ap-
proved. As Judge Cardozo said:
"The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hard-
ship enough, where consent has been withheld. We are not to
add to its rigor by refinement of construction, where consent has
been announced."' 5
LAWRENCE V. KAmINSKI
Adoption - Withdrawal of Parent's Consent to Adoption - Plain-
tiff, mother of a child born out of wedlock, delivered the child to the
defendant Bureau eight days after his birth. At the same time the
plaintiff executed a written instrument wherein she surrendered the
custody of the child and consented to the child's adoption by whosoever
the Bureau should select. At once the child was placed with the prospec-
tive adoptive parents. Two months after plaintiff gave up the child she
requested his return. One month after this request plaintiff petitioned
for habeas corpus to obtain the child. On a rehearing the lower court
dismissed the petition and plaintiff appealed. Held: That the formal
written grant of the infant by the mother is not binding on her although
it is stated in irrevocable terms. Commonwealth ex rel. Berg v. Catholic
Bureau, 76 A. (2d) 427 (Pa. 1950).
In 46 of the 48 states adoption proceedings are entirely statutory in
nature.' The natural parents' consent to an adoption proceeding is al-
most uniformly required in the various state statutes.2 If the natural
parents' consent is not given, the court is ordinarily held to be without
jurisdiction to grant an order of adoption unless the natural parents'
rights to the child have been judicially terminated.' After a final order
14 United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 70 S.Ct. 207(1949).
15 Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Company, 243 N.Y. 140, 153 N.E.
28 (1926).1 Quarles, The Law of Adoption-a Legal Anomaly, 32 Marq. L. Rev. 237, 241
(1949).
24 Vernier, American Family Laws 340 (1936).
3 Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922) "Except there be an
abandonment by the natural parents of th6 child and such fact of abandon-
ment be found, the written consent of or actual notice to the living natural
